Information has played a central role in understanding why international negotiations may break down into costly conflict. Barring indivisibilities or commitment problems, the literature finds that war can only occur between rational unitary actors because of private information about fundamentals such as capabilities, resolve, or costs. I show here, however, that negotiations may fail despite complete information about these fundamentals. All that is needed is for A to not know whether B knows-uncertainty about uncertainty. To ensure peace, then, states need not only know each other's attributes, but also the other's knowledge thereof, and potentially his knowledge of her own knowledge, and so on. Existing models, however, focus on first-order uncertainty and assume common knowledge of information partitions-an unlikely assumption, as states rarely know how much the other knows. This requirement of higher-order complete information illustrates the importance of explicitly incorporating information structures in bargaining models of conflict.
Introduction
The onset of costly interstate wars despite the existence of more efficient negotiated solutions is a longstanding puzzle in international conflict research.
Much of the literature points to the role of private information and incentives to misrepresent as causes for these bargaining failures. The argument is typically that one or both states misestimate resolve, preferences, costs, or the distribution of capabilities, and this asymmetric information can lead both to expect a positive utility for war.
Yet the asymmetric information included in crisis bargaining models is typically limited to payoff-relevant events-fundamentals such as capabilities, costs or preferences. What players do or do not know, on the other hand, is almost always assumed to be common knowledge.
1 There is, in other words, no uncertainty about the presence of uncertainty. States may not know what the other has, but they know whether she knows. In most real-world situations, however, states rarely know how much information the other has. They need to guess whether their opponent's spies succeeded in acquiring secret information (and hence whether their counterintelligence efforts have been successful), and whether the signals sent were interpreted correctly. What the other knows, in other words, is itself private and potentially strategic 1 We say that a proposition is common knowledge if every player knows it, every player knows that every player knows it, and so on ad infinitum (Aumann 1976) . A player's private information is any information that he has that is not common knowledge among all players in the game.
information.
We show here that bargaining may in fact break down into war simply because of uncertainty about uncertainty itself, even if both states completely know each other's capabilities, costs and resolve. This goes against the widespread idea that complete information alone is sufficient to ensure peace. The intuition for this result is simple: suppose that A thinks B might be mistaken about the distribution of power (even if she is not). For example, A might think that B thinks A has developed nuclear capabilities-i.e., that the balance of power is less favourable to B than it actually is. If it is sufficiently probable that B is mistaken, then A has an incentive to offer her a small share of the pie. But because there is a chance that B actually knows the truth, B might in fact prefer war to that offer. In sum, this research note shows the importance of higher-order uncer-tainty for the onset of war. War may occur between two rational and unitary actors despite complete information about capabilities or resolve if players are unsure of whether the other knows the distribution of power and resolve.
The paper proceeds in three steps. First, the role of information and common knowledge in the bargaining literature is discussed. Second, we present a simple model of complete information about fundamentals, without problems of indivisibility or commitment, in which war nonetheless occurs with positive probability in all equilibria due to uncertainty about information partitions. Having established the importance of higher-order information,
we then address in a third section the challenges associated with reaching common knowledge.
Uncertain Uncertainty
The role of information in interstate relationships has been at the core of the research on conflict over the past 30 years. The central explanation for the onset of war between rational actors is the idea that at least one player has incomplete information about some of his opponents' attributes such as their capabilities, resolve or costs for war (Jervis 1976 , Blainey 1988 , Fearon 1995 , Powell 1996 , Van Evera 1999 , Reiter 2003 .
2 Private information and 2 Of course, not all of the bargaining literature is related to incomplete information-see for example rationalist explanations for war related to commitment problems (Powell 2004b , Chadefaux 2011 , Chadefaux 2012 or indivisibilities (Toft 2006) . Gartzke (1999) , however, argues that the three rationalist explanations presented in Fearon (1995)-private incentives to misrepresent it, in turn, lead to misperceptions or miscalculations about the distribution of power or resolve. Negotiators may thus be optimistic about the expected outcome of a war, with the result that both believe they have a higher expected value for war than for peace (Fey & Ramsay 2007 , Slantchev & Tarar 2011 .
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The type of uncertainty that is typically modeled, however, relates only to payoffs. The games include some uncertainty space corresponding to payoffrelevant attributes, together with the information players have about these attributes. Blainey's often-cited argument, for example, is that "wars usually begin when two nations disagree on their relative strength" (Blainey 1988, p. 246) . Similarly Fearon (1995, p. 18) focuses on "disagreements about relative power and uncertainty about a potential opponent's willingness to fight." 4 In these models, players may be unsure of each other's attributes such as the distribution of capabilities or interest, or the cost of war, but information, commitment problems, and indivisibilities-are all instances of inefficiencies caused by one form or another of incomplete information.
3 Asymmetric information may also lead wars to last longer than they would otherwise (Wittman 1979 , Wagner 2000 , Filson & Werner 2002 , Slantchev 2003 , Powell 2004a , Smith & Stam 2004 incomplete and trade never happens because common knowledge allows the actors to infer from an offer that the other must know something they do not, or else they would not want to trade (Milgrom & Stokey 1982 , Fey & Ramsay 2007 . Through a potentially infinite regress, they infer that the expected utility of the deal cannot be larger than the one of no trade, and hence trade never occurs. 9 This led to an analogous result in the conflict 7 Information is complete when each agent knows the other agent's utility function and rules of the game. However, this definition does not include the mutual awareness of the players, which is called 'common knowledge'. 8 Rubinstein (1989), for example, demonstrates that even Nash equilibria which survive the usual refinements may not be robust to a small lack of common knowledge. 9 Milgrom & Stokey (1982) 's 'no-trade' result considers a situation in which traders have asymmetric information but share common knowledge that a trade is mutually acceptable.
In that case, no trade will take place between traders since "the mere willingness of the literature. Fey & Ramsay (2007) argue that "the fundamental reason that mutual optimism cannot lead to war is that if both sides are willing to fight, each should infer that they have either underestimated the strength of the opponent or overestimated their own strength. In either case, these inferences lead to a peaceful settlement of the dispute" (p. 738).
10 The point that is being made here, however, is the converse. It is that even with complete information but without common knowledge, war may occur in equilibrium.
We now show this with a simple model.
Model
Two states, A and B, negotiate over the partition of a territory of size normalized to one. There are two types of A: a 'strong' A, denoted A s , would win a conflict against B with probability p s , whereas a 'weak' A (A w ) would win with probability p w . A's type is determined by an initial move by nature.
other traders to accept their parts of the bet is evidence to at least one trader that his own part is unfavourable. Hence no trade can be found that is acceptable to all traders.
This no-trade result depends crucially on the assumption that it is common knowledge when a trade is carried out that it is feasible and that it is mutually acceptable to all of the participants" (p. 9). See also the related work of Sebenius & Geanakoplos (1983) and Morris (1994) . 10 Slantchev & Tarar (2011) argue, however, that conflict differs from trade in a fundamental way: whereas both parties need to agree to a trade (the equivalent of conflict for our purposes), war on the other hand requires the assent of only one of the two parties.
Hence the no-trade theorem does not apply.
Both players know the distribution of power, but A is unsure whether B knows it. To represent this uncertainty, there must therefore be states of the world reached with positive probability in which B knows the distribution of power, and others in which B does not. We represent these by a move by nature, such that instead of having two possible types corresponding to two distributions of power, nature has four possible moves, corresponding to the combination of A's two possible types (w and s) and B's two possible states of knowledge (figure ). 11 In short, A observes her own type, but does not know whether B observes A's type. We use parentheses to denote a player's information partition. For example, (x, y) denotes an information partition in which a player knows that she is at either x or y, but not which of the two.
With probability p 1 , for example, the state is w 1 , in which case B observes (w 1 ) and knows A's type. In this state, however, A only observes (w 1 , w 2 ), and hence assigns positive probability to state w 2 being the true state-a state in which B would not know A's type.
Following Nature's move, we assume for simplicity a take-it or leave-it bargaining protocol in which A makes an offer x ∈ [0, 1], where x denotes A's proposed share of the territory (and hence 1 − x denotes B's share). B observes the offer, which she either accepts or rejects. If B accepts, then 11 We follow Harsanyi (2004) and model the absence of common knowledge using a game of incomplete information. To be clear, however, we are not introducing incomplete information about any payoff-relevant attributes, but rather incomplete information about incomplete information itself, as a way to model the absence of common knowledge. See also Fudenberg & Tirole (1991, 556-7) . players receive their respective share of the pie and the game ends. If B rejects, however, then war follows, in which case A wins the entire territory with probability p i (and hence B wins with probability 1 − p i ), where i ∈ {w, s} denotes A's type, and both players incur cost c ∈ (0, 1). We assume for simplicity of exposition that both players are risk-neutral (i.e., u i (x) = x).
The intuition for the game's equilibrium is simple. Suppose that A observes (w 1 , w 2 ). This means that A is 'weak', but also that A is not sure whether or not B knows that she is weak, because A assigns positive probability to w 2 being the actual state. Indeed, if w 2 was the true state, B would observe (w 2 , s 1 ), and hence would assign positive probability to the true state of the world being s 1 , i.e., to the possibility that A is 'strong'. In other words, upon observing (w 1 , w 2 ), A assigns positive probability to B thinking she is strong. But in that case, i.e., if B thinks A might be strong, then B might be willing to accept a distribution of the pie that reflects this. In turn, this means that A could make an offer x corresponding to a strong type, which B would accept given her beliefs. In equilibrium, therefore, A makes an offer which grants her a large portion of the pie, with the hope that B does not actually observe the true distribution of power. Because B may, however, observe it (since with probability p 1 the state is w 1 ), war occurs with positive probability. For certain combinations of the parameters, we even show that war occurs with positive probability in all perfect bayesian equilibria of the game.
Whether this can be an equilibrium strategy depends, of course, on the probability of w 1 being the true state of the world given that A observes (w 1 , w 2 ), as well as on s 1 being the true state of the world when B observes (w 2 , s 1 ). In particular, it is crucial that w 1 -the probability that B knows given that A observes (w 1 , w 2 )-be sufficiently unlikely, so that A would want to take the risk to bluff upon observing (w 1 , w 2 ) (or else B would reject the offer and fight), and that s 1 be sufficiently probable for B to accept upon observing (w 2 , s 1 ) (or else she would rather take the risk to reject). We now present the logic of the equilibrium in more detail.
Separating Equilibrium. Consider first the possibility of an equilibrium in which each type of A makes a different offer. Without loss of generality, assume that A offers x w upon observing (w 1 , w 2 ) but x s upon observing (s 1 , s 2 ). In this case B always infers from A's offer which type she is facing, and war never occurs. But does such an equilibrium exist? A weak A may be tempted to deviate and offer x s , which B, given her posterior beliefs, will accept upon observing either (w 2 , s 1 ) or (s 2 ). The risk that A runs, of course, is that B actually observes (w 1 ) and hence knows that A is bluffing, in which case war occurs. But if the temptation is sufficiently large and the probability that B discovers the truth (i.e., p 1 ) sufficiently low, then A will be willing to take that risk and bluff. In that case, A deviates from the equilibrium path, and this can therefore not form the basis of a perfect bayesian equilibrium.
There is hence no separating equilibrium (details of the derivation and proofs in the appendix).
Then there is no peaceful separating perfect bayesian equilibrium.
12 This is intuitive. q A 2 is A's posterior probability of being at w 2 upon observing (w 1 , w 2 ). A large q A 2 means a low probability of being caught deviating, and hence that A will be more willing to deviate.
Pooling Equilibrium. Consider now a pooling equilibrium in which both types of A offer x * . Clearly, x * must be large enough to satisfy a strong A, as otherwise A would prefer fighting to that agreement. But if x * is too large, then B will reject it upon observing (w 2 , s 1 ), leading to war-an outcome that neither type of A would like.
12 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a pair (s, b) of strategy profile s and beliefs b such that s is sequentially rational given beliefs b, and b is consistent with s. See Fudenberg & Tirole (1991, p. 215 
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Then there is exists a pooling perfect bayesian equilibrium in which all types of A offer x * = p s − c, which B accepts unless she observes (w 1 ), in which case she rejects and war ensues.
The main proposition then follows immediately: for certain combinations of p i and nature's moves, there are no peaceful equilibria, and war occurs with positive probability.
. Then in every pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, war occurs with probability p 1 .
This implies that even if both A and B know each other's attributes (i.e.,
w 1 is the true state of the world), war occurs in equilibrium.
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Reaching Common Knowledge
The simple model above shows that common knowledge about the distribution of information itself can be a necessary condition for the existence of peaceful equilibria. To avoid war, then, countries need to bridge their perceptions not only of each other's capabilities and resolve, but also of what each knows. Narrowing this gap, however, may prove even more difficult than in the case of first-order asymmetric information. First, the need for 13 Note that this implicitly assumes that p 1 ≤ p 3 . 14 There also exist an infinity of semi-separating equilibria, each of which also involves a positive probability of war.
higher order information means that states not only need to send a message, but also to ensure that that message was well received and understood. A message-a 'confirmation'-is therefore also needed, itself subject to further miscommunication and misperception. Learning what the other knows Finally, open source intelligence relies on the analysis of journals, radio and television, but is doubly limited: first by the information available to the other country's media, and second by possible manipulation.
These limitations of intelligence gathering of course also apply to the opponent. As a result, it is difficult to know just how much the adversary knows.
Has he discovered your secret nuclear program, or the absence thereof? Are (Schelling 1980 , Fearon 1997 , Kydd 2005 , Trager 2010 , including the use of audience costs (Fearon 1994 , but see also Snyder & Borghard (2011)), or even cheap talk (Trager 2010 , Crawford & Sobel 1982 , Farrell & Gibbons 1989 , Sartori 2002 . These messages aim to convey information about a state's capabilities and resolve, but also their beliefs about those of the other. Yet signals also often fail. They may fail to be detected or interpreted as informative signals (Jervis 2002 , Mercer 2010 and may be affected by a variety of biases (Holsti 1962 , Yarhi-Milo 2013 , Jervis 2015 .
These well-known challenges associated with conveying information are amplified when dealing with common knowledge, because of the need for higher-order levels of information. A signal need not only be sent, but confirmation of its receipt and adequate understanding must also be conveyed back to the sender. The recipient might even have confirmed receipt, but not know whether the sender has received that receipt. Suppose for example that A sends a credible message to B, but that with a small but positive probability the message will be garbled or misinterpreted. Even supposing that the message arrives properly, B still needs to make it clear to A that she received the message. But again, her confirmation and the interpretation might be garbled. So by now A knows, B knows, and A knows that B knows, but B does not know that A knows that B knows. So A needs to send a confirmation, and so on. This problem, known as the coordinated attack problem, illustrates one of the difficulties associated with reaching common knowledge. Finally, second-or higher-order information may also be necessary to infer first-order information. Suppose for example that A finds out that B knows that A is weak. Combined with the fact that B did not attack, A may infer that B is actually weak himself. Clearly, B will therefore want to avoid revealing that he knows that A is weak.
Creating Common Knowledge
There are, however, ways by which states can convey information about attributes such as their military capabilities so that they become common knowledge. They may for instance choose to reveal or display their capabilities publicly. Displays of artillery on national commemoration days, for example, or heavily publicized tests of new weapons thus serve two purposes:
signal strength, but also ensure these capabilities are common knowledge.
Joint military manoeuvres may also serve the same purpose. By granting the other a more intimate access to her resources, military capabilities become common knowledge. 
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 (no separating equilibrium).
Consider first the possibility of a separating equilibrium in which A offers x w upon observing (w 1 , w 2 ) but x s upon observing (s 1 , s 2 ). B's posterior probabilities q i of being at state s i upon observing offer x k and information set (θ s ) are then: − β for any 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 2c. This means that A will deviate (regardless of B's beliefs off the equilibrium), and hence there can be no separating equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2 (pooling equilibrium).
Clearly there can be no pooling equilibrium in which A offers x * < p s − c, B's beliefs off the equilibrium must be such that she assumes from any offer x = x * that she is facing a weak A. If not, then at least A w will want to Proof of Proposition 1.
The proof follows directly from lemma 3.1 and 3.2. To show that war occurs with positive probability in every PBE, simply replace x * = p s − c in the proof of lemma 3.2 with x * = p s − c + γ, where γ ∈ [0, 2c] is such that
